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This Game Is Rigged: The Unequal Protection of Our
Mentally-Ill Incarcerated Women
By
Joanna E. Saul*

Introduction

This paper will examine recent inmate equal protection
cases and will argue that Flynn and similar plaintiffs nationwide
More mentally-ill women fill our jails and prisons every stand little chance of success, given the impossible standard
day.1 Within the past few years, the number of women entering established by the federal appellate courts that defeats any equal
our state prisons has increased at almost twice the rate of men.2 protection claim brought by female inmates. Part I will introduce
Even more astonishing is that 73% of these women in state pris- the problem of inadequate mental health treatment for female
ons have a mental health problem, in striking contrast to only inmates, including the current level of illness in the female popu55% of male state inmates.3 Both male and female inmates are lation entering prison, and the gender-based differences in care
equally dependent on the state to provide mental health treatment that the women receive. Part II will examine the Equal Protecand both have an equal right to care under the
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Constitution.4 However, women often receive
in relation to the American correctional
. . . the courts have granted system. It will compare the most recent
mental health services inferior in quality and
quantity to those received by men.
Equal Protection cases brought by prison
“substantial deference”
If denied treatment, female inmates
inmates to the seminal case of United
to prison authorities and
may have to resort to the courts. In 2005, sevStates v. Virginia, involving female colhave perpetuated gender
eral female inmates at the Taycheedah Corlege students. This section will also advorectional Institution in Wisconsin filed Flynn
cate for a similar application of the law
discrimination.
v. Doyle5 with the assistance of the Wisconsin
to the claims of female inmates. Part III
ACLU on behalf of all women incarcerated in
will conclude that courts need to create
Taycheedah. The lead plaintiff, Kristine Flynn, is a 48 year old a workable standard that ensures the constitutional equal protecwoman who suffers from bipolar mood disorder and social anxi- tion rights of female inmates.
ety syndrome.6 She is considered seriously mentally-ill by the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections.7 According to the complaint, Flynn was prescribed eight different psychotropic mediI. The Inadequate Treatment of Mentally-Ill
cations within one year, taking some of them simultaneously.8
Women Prisoners
Yet she only had her blood drawn once to test her liver function
during that year.9 In 2002, prison staff ordered her to be immediMental illness is a serious problem for the majority of
ately taken off of all medications.10 Flynn attempted suicide six America’s female inmate population. Inadequate mental health
days later.11 After being taken to the hospital, she took one person resources for female inmates affect more than just the residents
hostage and assaulted a security guard.12 The court-appointed within the prison walls: most inmates eventually leave the prison
psychiatrist testified that her behavior was due to the interruption and return to the community from which they came.20 The folin her medication, yet an entire month passed after the assault lowing sections examine first the prevalence of mental health illbefore she was remedicated.13 Four years were added to her sen- nesses among female inmates; second, gender-based differences
tence, she was housed in segregation, and she still did not receive in mental health treatment in prisons; and third, the constitutional
her medication.14 Flynn was unable to eat, sleep, or take care right of inmates to adequate mental health treatment.
of her basic needs during this period15 and she attempted suicide again.16 She did not receive any group or individual therapy,
A. The Mental Illness of America’s Prison
despite having requested counseling several times.17 This case is
Population
still pending in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin.
Flynn is representative not only of women in the WisThe mental health of America’s inmates is in a crisis:
consin correctional system, but of mentally-ill women in cor- 73% of women in state prisons have a mental health problem.21
rectional institutions across the nation who receive inadequate The cause of this crisis is clear: as public mental hospitals have
and ultimately harmful treatment. Imprisoned litigants, such as emptied due to cost and other pressures, the mentally-ill, who
Flynn, will have to battle separately in each state for their mental rightfully should be treated in a hospital setting, have entered
health needs. And indeed, if the prison system ignores their needs, our prison systems.22 From 1955 to 2000, the number of patients
courts may be the best recourse. According to the Supreme Court, housed in state mental hospitals dropped from almost 560,000
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental to about 56,000.23 Between 2000 and 2003, the average number
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty of residents in state- and county-run mental hospitals was less
to protect constitutional rights.”18 Yet this promise may be mere than 50,000.24 Similarly, the lengths of stays in private psychiattalk: in reality, the courts have granted “substantial deference” to ric hospitals dropped from twenty-one days per episode in 1980
prison authorities19 and have perpetuated gender discrimination. to five or six days in 2004.25 Conversely, the adult population in
42
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under correctional supervision grew from 1,842,100 in 1980 to mentally-ill.40 In comparison, in a 2006 study, when others within
7,211,400 in 2006.26 According to a recent Bureau of Justice Sta- the prison were surveyed regarding symptoms demonstrated by
tistics’ estimation, 705,600 inmates in state prisons had a mental the inmate population, 73% of the female state inmate population
health problem at midyear 2005.27 Assuming these numbers are were identified as mentally-ill.41 Clearly, better screening tools
correct, there are currently fourteen times as many mentally-ill need to be developed and used.
persons housed in our correctional facilities
Even when women are successas in our state mental hospitals. Women in
fully identified by a screening instrument,
Under the Eighth
particular are afflicted, as a greater percentmen have better access to medical serage of female inmates are reported to have
vices42 by virtue of their larger populaAmendment,
prisons
are
28
a mental health problem, while there is
tion. Many treatment programs have been
constitutionally required
lesser availability of treatment.
designed with men in mind43 and have not
to
provide
medical
In addition to their basic mental
taken into account the unique needs of the
health needs, inmates with mental health
female population.44 In addition, several
health care for inmates.
problems also have a higher probability of
state prison systems have facilities desigsubstance abuse29 and self-harm, includnated solely for use as a psychiatric hospital
ing suicide.30 Drug abuse has serious public health implications, for men, but have no corresponding facilities for women.45 This
including the increased risk of disease transmission, such as HIV/ is a primary basis for complaint in Flynn v. Doyle: in Wisconsin,
AIDS, as well as the risk of injury to any children the women only men have access to a facility providing round-the-clock care
may be carrying. A strong correlation exists between severe men- and individualized treatment.46 The prisons justify gender sepatal disorders and suicidal inclinations31—suicide is therefore a rations in prison based on security reasons and limited finances.
substantial concern with any mentally-ill incarcerated popula- However, under the Equal Protection Clause, women should not
tion and particularly with female inmates.32 Common methods be denied the same level of care available to men simply based
of suicide attempts by inmates include hanging, overdose, lac- on their gender.
eration, asphyxiation, and ingestion of toxic substances such as
shampoo.33
C. The Constitutional Requirement for Mental
Female inmates across America are afflicted with menHealth Treatment in Prison
tal health problems that require attention. Without effective
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisons are constitutiontreatment, these women return to the community with the same
ally
required
to provide medical health care for inmates.47 The
illnesses, if not made worse due to the length of time without
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted this obligation as inclutreatment.
sive of mental health care.48 According to the Fourth Circuit,

B. Gender Bias in the Provision of Mental Health
Services in Prison
Gender bias in prison has resulted in both over-diagnosis
and under-diagnosis of mental illness. Historically, prison staff
have used medication to sedate inmates and control disruptive
behavior.34 Criminal women in particular have been “treated”
because they exhibited “male” characteristics such as anger or
aggression that did not fit the societal mold of the docile homemaker.35 Conversely, female mentally-ill inmates often suffer
from inadequate treatment because they are not correctly identified as mentally-ill or because the prison does not have the
resources to treat them.36 Prisons that do not have the necessary
resources frequently house the mentally-ill in disciplinary segregation, limiting the inmates’ access to programming or social
interaction.37
A primary obstacle to the adequate treatment of men
tally-ill female inmates is the lack of a national validated instrument for mental health screening for adult prison.38 Each state
has come up with its own system, with varying success. In general, prisons’ tools for screening inmates with mental illnesses are
faulty.39 Without a standardized, reliable system, prison staff are
subject to the gender stereotypes that have been shown to affect
treatment choices and they are more likely to overlook inmates
who do need treatment. The inmates themselves may not know
that they have a problem and therefore may not bring themselves
to the attention of a mental health professional. For example, in
a Bureau of Justice Statistics’ study in 1999, only 24% of women
in state prison and local jails evaluated themselves as being
Spring 2009

[an inmate] is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health
care provider, exercising ordinary skill and
care at the time of observation, concludes with
reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or
injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3)
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by
reason of delay or the denial of care would be
substantial.49
The numerous phrases open to interpretation in the above standard render it useless for practical guidance to prison officials.50
Thus, several district courts have provided more definite guideposts by which to judge a prison health care system:
The six components are: (1) a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates to
identify those in need of mental health care; (2)
a treatment program that involves more than
segregation and close supervision of mentally
ill inmates; (3) employment of a sufficient
number of trained mental health professionals; (4) maintenance of accurate, complete, and
confidential mental health treatment records;
(5) administration of psychotropic medication
only with appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation; and (6) a basic program to
43

identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for
suicide.51
While this standard provides more definite boundaries for a
prison healthcare program, it has not been affirmed by a higher
court.52 Ultimately, female inmates’ constitutional right to and
need for adequate mental health care is not being met.

II. The Unequal Protection of
Female Inmates
Female inmates wishing to sue prisons based on their
inadequate treatment will find that the federal courts have narrowed prison-based equal protection law such that it is nearly
impossible for female inmates to succeed. The courts have established two barriers to a successful action: (1) splitting hairs over
what constitutes “similarly situated” inmate groups and (2) deference to prison finances.

A. The Courts’ Discriminatory Application of
Equal Protection Law
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat similarly situated people
alike.53 It prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender by state actors.54 Under this standard, discriminatory
classification or treatment between men and women is subject to
heightened scrutiny.55 For a gender-based classification to withstand the heightened standard of scrutiny, it must “serve important governmental objectives,” and “the discriminatory means
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.” 56 To succeed on an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must pass a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to others who received more favorable treatment.57 The next
sections will examine the recent history of equal protection jurisprudence, providing an in-depth look at the courts’ reasoning.

1. Equal Protection of Female Inmates
Flynn’s biggest challenge in the Equal Protection arena
is finding a “similarly situated” group to satisfy the courts. “Similarly situated” has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court:
the two groups do not have to be alike in every aspect.58 In fact,
in City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living Center, the Supreme
Court said that even though the group home for the mentally disabled, which was denied a permit by the city, was different from
other facilities that were permitted permits, the main question
was whether the proposed group home would affect the legitimate governmental interests in a way that the permitted uses did
not.59 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,60 a case involving students of different ages and
races, and schools of different sizes, the question of whether the
students were similarly situated did not even arise.
Female inmates, however, have received far different
treatment in the lower courts. For example, in Klinger v. Dep’t of
Corrections, the plaintiffs housed at Nebraska’s female institution stated for the purposes of litigation that they were similarly
situated to a male facility.61 The trial court agreed that the two
groups were similarly situated because they were both housed in
44

Nebraska correctional institutions, the institutions had a similar
range of custodial levels, and the purposes of incarceration were
the same for both groups.62 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed
the lower court’s decision by highlighting the differences between
the two institutions: the male facility housed six times as many
inmates as the women’s; the average stay at the men’s facility was
two to three times as long as at the women’s; the men’s facility
was two security grades higher than the women’s; and the women
had different characteristics from the men due to their parental status and likelihood of past abuse.63 Further, the appellate
court highlighted economic limitations: “[W]hen determining
programming at an individual prison under the restrictions of a
limited budget, prison officials must make hard choices.” 64 Thus,
the court was willing to allow inferior programming for women
based on “limited resources.” 65 The court seemed to conclude
that comparing male and female institutions is not just comparing apples and oranges, but comparing apples and Volkswagens.
The Eighth Circuit also granted substantial deference
to the prisons.66 The court concluded that doing any prison-toprison program comparison was “futile” and that doing such
a comparison “places the burden on prison officials to explain
decisions that resulted from the complicated interplay of many
variables.” 67 The court stated that any such asking of explanation would result in “micro-management” and worried that the
facilities would end up providing only the “bare constitutional
minimum of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal
protection liability.” 68 The aim of the litigation was to show that
the prison already was failing to provide the “bare constitutional
minimum.” Thus, in providing its worst-case scenario of the
prison sticking to the bare minimum, the court avoids forcing the
prisons to abide by the Constitution so as to avoid litigation.
In the murkiness of prison-based equal protection litigation, at least one court has made clear what “similarly situated”
does not mean: in Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corrections v. D.C., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected a three-factor test that included similar custody levels,
sentence structures, and purposes of incarceration.69 Instead, the
court emphasized that there are “many considerations” and “innumerable variables,” including the characteristics of the inmates and
the size of the institution.70 This standard is extremely vague and
presents difficulties to future female prisoner litigants in choosing a similarly situated group to which to compare themselves.
Yet even after this rhetoric of innumerable variables, the court
focused on but one: the fact that the men’s prison had 936 inmates
and the women’s prison had only 167.71 The court concluded that
“it is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination” that
the smaller facility had fewer programs.72 This holding is disturbing because it in effect denies to women inmates any potential
success on equal protection grounds. Women compose a much
smaller percentage of the total inmate population.73 The smaller
number of female inmates allows most states to house all women
in the same, multi-classification prison, while men by virtue of
their greater population size can be broken into institutions by
individual classifications.74 Under the court’s holding, even if
the women were housed in separate institutions by classification,
they would not be similarly situated to the men due to population;
and if the women were housed together, they would not be similarly situated due to classification. The court fails to acknowledge
this reality.
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Other courts have also adhered to this belief that differThe court finishes with a parting lecture to the correcing sizes in population necessitates differing number and qual- tional authorities on the constitutional rights of inmates—a lecity of programs. In Keenan v. Smith, in which female inmates ture notably absent from the cases involving female inmates. The
brought an equal protection action based on denial of post- court begins with the lofty statement that “[t]he great object of
secondary education programs and prison industry employment, our Constitution is to preserve individual rights” and that “prison
the Eighth Circuit stated that “because
inmates are not completely stripped of
women account for such a small proportion
these rights as they step through the
of the total prison population, their facilities The logical extension of the prison gates.” 86 Further, the court chides
are necessarily smaller in size than any of court’s opinions is that women that a “prisoner may not be denied equal
the male-only prisons.” 75 It further admitted
treatment afforded those who share his
must wait until an equal
that due to the small size of the institution,
relevant characteristics, simply because
the most comparable in size of the male
number of women and men statistics show that he belongs to a group
institutions is an institution of the highest are incarcerated before they that typically does not bear those relevant
security classification.76 The Keenan court
characteristics.” 87 This is remarkable: in
can
ask
for
equal
services
concluded that two sets of dissimilarly situother words, a prisoner cannot be denied
ated inmates cannot be meaningfully comequal treatment afforded to others, “simand programs.
pared.77 At least in this case, Judge Heaney
ply” because statistics and data demonacknowledged the reality that under these
strate that he is not actually equal to the
standards, no group of female inmates could ever have standing others. No such allowance for numerical discrepancies was evifor an equal protection claim.78 His is a lone voice. The logical dent in the women’s cases. The gender discrimination evident in
extension of the court’s opinions is that women must wait until the courts’ opinions mars any chance that female inmates might
an equal number of women and men are incarcerated before they have to bring a successful equal protection suit.
can ask for equal services and programs.
Even if the inmates could prove that they were similarly
As a thought experiment, let us follow the courts’ logic situated, they would still have to show that the statute or reguto its conclusion. For women to establish themselves as similarly lation intentionally discriminated against them. In Canterino v.
situated to men, they must compare themselves by either (1) secu- Wilson, the Sixth Circuit found that the female inmates “failed
rity classification or (2) population. Female inmates have a low to prove that the denial of study and work release to members
chance of successful comparison under the first prong because of their class is gender-based discrimination on its face, because
while most of female prisons include prisoners of all classifica- both men and women are included in the class of people who
tions, the men’s prisons are often broken up into individual clas- may be denied study and work release.” 88 Under this standard,
sifications due to the number of inmates at each classification a claim based on the denial of programs could potentially fail
level.79 Thus, no such similarly situated group exists. Under the simply because not all male inmates received care.
second prong, if women were to use population size to establish
In some cases, gender segregation in prison may provide
a similarly situated group, they would be limited to the highest sufficient evidence of gender discrimination so that discriminasecurity men’s prisons. The highest security men’s prisons often tory intent need not be established. A Fourth Circuit opinion
house their inmates in solitary confinement for twenty-three found that “discriminatory intent need not be established indehours a day and therefore offer few, if any, programs.80 Fight- pendently when the classification is explicit.” 89 Prisons across
ing for these programs would not win the female inmates more the nation are segregated by gender and, although such segregaprogramming than they already have. For the female inmates, it tion has been found to be constitutional,90 the practice of sending
is a losing game.
women to one prison and men to another facially classifies on the
In shocking contrast, when men raise the equal protec- basis of gender.91 If the court finds that the resulting difference
tion issue, the courts take an entirely different view. Only a year in access to services imposes a burden on the female inmates,
before Keenan, a male inmate brought an equal protection claim discriminatory intent may not need to be established.
before the Eighth Circuit in Bills v. Dahm81 and received sigOverall, the courts have created an unworkable stannificantly different treatment. In Bills, the male inmate alleged dard, yet refuse to acknowledge that it effectively bars incarcerthat he was denied overnight visitation from his infant son while ated female litigants from recovery. Courts should not dismiss
female inmates were allowed such visitation.82 Instead of review- an Equal Protection case based on population differences, but
ing its laundry list of differences between a male Level 2 facil- should start from the premise that male and female inmates are
ity and a female Level 4 facility—the same levels of facilities similarly situated due to the equal dependence on the state to procontemplated in Klinger 83—the court stated that “[b]oth prisons vide mental health services and both have an equal right to care
hold a significant number of maximum security offenders.” 84 Pre- under the Constitution.
sumably, no drastic changes had occurred in the Nebraska correctional system, yet the court offered no analysis of the differing 2. United States v. Virginia: Separate
population sizes. Instead, the court concluded that “the make-up But Not Equal
of the inmate population at each of the prisons are not markedly
In United States v. Virginia, decided shortly after the
dissimilar,” yet allows, grudgingly, that it is “objectively reasonabove
cases,
the Supreme Court contemplated the Equal Protecable” for a prison official to have believed that the two groups
85
tion
Clause
in
regard to gender segregated institutions of higher
of inmates were not similarly situated. This is a quite a change
education,
coming
to a very different result. The Virginia Milfrom the previous opinions that found an insurmountable differitary
Institute
(“VMI”)
historically accepted only men into its
ence between male and female prisons.
Spring 2009
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academy.92 VMI enrolled about 1,300 male cadets each year.93
In response to litigation contesting its refusal of female candidates, VMI proposed a separate, parallel program for women:
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (“VMIL”), which had
an expected first-year class of twenty-five women.94 While the
institutions would share the same mission, “the VWIL program
would differ from VMI in academic offerings, methods of education, and financial resources,” 95 largely based on the perceived
differences and needs of a female population.96 The different
population sizes and program options are analogous to those in
male and female prisons, yet here the Court ruled in favor of
the female plaintiffs, finding that VWIL was not an appropriately
parallel program and that VMI must admit female cadets. A court
has even more reason to make a similar ruling in favor of female
inmates; students have the option of choosing whether to attend
an inferior school whereas female inmates have no choice.
Justice Ginsburg began her opinion in Virginia with the
core instruction of equal protection analysis: “Parties who seek
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
exceedingly persuasive justification for that action.” 97 The court
“has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they
are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their
individual talents and capacities.” 98 Any justification of such a
policy must demonstrate “important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.” 99 Sex-based classifications may not be used “to create or perpetuate the legal, social,
and economic inferiority of women.”100 In Flynn’s case, the gender differences in availability of treatment result in distinct disadvantages to female inmates: they receive inferior mental health
services, which will affect their ability to participate in vocational training and other programming integral to post-release
success. When the prison denies them equal services, they are
maintained in an inferior position relative to the men who receive
the services, a disadvantage that affects the women even postincarceration.
In examining VMI’s justification for the male-only classification, the court stated that a justification “must describe
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact
differently grounded.”101 The court rejected Virginia’s claim
that VMI furthered diversity in educational institution choices;
although single-sex institutions may in fact promote diversity,
Virginia’s public institution history provided no evidence that
VMI’s single-sex admission policy was intended to further this
purpose.102 Applying this analysis to Flynn’s case, the primary
reason for gender-segregation in prison appears to be population management or security. Neither reason, however, bears any
rational relation to the differing quality of mental health treatment between the male and female institutions.
Differences in institutional populations did not keep the
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia from finding similarly
situated groups. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
justified its holding denying programs to the smaller female correctional institutions by stating that parents of students at Smith
College, an all-female institution, would not raise an eyebrow to
discover that Harvard University, many times Smith’s size, offers
46

considerably more classes.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court did
not even discuss in Virginia the 1,300 student enrollment of VMI
in comparison with the twenty-five student enrollment of VWIL.
In addition, inmates have an even stronger claim for
medical and mental health services than for educational programming.104 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that “an inmate has no constitutional right to work and
educational opportunities.”105 Yet under an Eighth Amendment
analysis in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court declared that
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.106 If the Supreme
Court was dissatisfied with a facility that planned to enroll a mere
twenty-five female students a year, surely the federal courts can
do better for the 112,498 women in prison who are denied not
just educational opportunities, but health care to which they have
a constitutional right.
The second prong of the Virginia analysis focused on
the proposed remedial measures to be taken by Virginia to remedy the equal protection violation. Any remedy must “closely
fit the constitutional violation [and] must be shaped to place
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of
discrimination.”107 In the context of prisons, the mental health
resources currently available to men—such as separate facilities
solely for the treatment of mentally-ill inmates and additional
health staff and programs—must be made equally available to
female inmates.
Overall, the federal circuit courts have largely dismissed
female inmates’ suits based on a flawed notion of what constitutes a “similarly situated” party. In contrast, the Supreme Court
has always treated the similarly situated analysis as inclusive of
groups with some differences and has applied it to higher education institutions much more leniently than the appellate courts
have to the female inmate litigants.

B. The ‘Important Governmental Objective’
of Parsimony
The primary justification for a prison’s discriminatory
policies often comes down to economics. If gender discrimination is established, it may still survive heightened scrutiny if the
correctional authorities can establish important governmental
objectives that are accomplished through this discrimination.108
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has already
declared that, even allowing that a burden has been imposed on
female inmates due to gender discrimination, limited financial
resources are enough reason to justify the prison’s discrimination.109 The Eighth Circuit has also found that any analysis of
gender discrimination in female inmates’ programming must
make allowances for the prison’s limited resources and economic
constraints.110 Even in Bowring v. Godwin, a case that extended
an inmate’s constitutional right to medical care to also include
mental health care,111 the Fourth Circuit stated:
The right to treatment is, of course, limited to
that which may be provided upon a reasonable
cost and time basis and the essential test is one
of medical necessity and not simply that which
may be considered merely desirable.112
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No one would argue that gender or racial discrimination
could exist in greater society based on financial considerations;
consider the obvious costs of providing equal pay for equal work.
The courts’ argument that a constitutional right can be limited
by cost therefore seems inherently wrong and solely based on
the prisoners’ incarcerated status.113 Thus, even when the female
inmates have a winning hand in proving discrimination, they may
still fail because the house is bankrupt.

III. Conclusion
Flynn should use United States v. Virginia to argue that
differing populations and genders cannot be a basis for discrimination in correctional facilities. The broader, national concern,

however, is with the attitude of the courts toward inmates, and the
allowances made for discrimination based on imprisonment status. Tellingly, none of the Equal Protection cases found in favor
of the inmates. The courts have erected serious obstacles to a successful claim by creating an unworkable standard for “similarly
situated” prison groups and allowing finances to limit constitutional rights. Inadequate services for mentally-ill female inmates
harm not just the women, but also the poor, urban communities to
which many of these women return. Without mental health care,
the women are at a greater risk of recidivism. The bottom line
is that female inmates have a constitutional right to medical and
mental health care and a right to equal treatment to that received
by the male inmates, which is not currently being provided in
America’s prisons.
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. . . adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.’ Analyzing this case using a program comparison between NSP and NCW,
however, places dozens of substantive administrative prison decisions under
close judicial scrutiny and subjects them to after-the-fact second-guessing by
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75 100 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1996).
76 Id.
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the dissimilarity of the two distinct groups and the irrelevance of any attempt to
compare the number or type of programs offered.”) (internal citations omitted).
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107 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547.
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